WITTGENSTEINS PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT AND CHILDRENS UNDERSTANDING OF THE MIND

A theoretical statement about children's understanding of the mind is derived from Wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein ar gued that understanding the mind is a process embedded in acquiring th e rules governing the use of linguistic expressions about the mind. Th ese rules are publicly agreed upon and, therefore, separable from one' s subjective phenomenological experiences. The implications of this ar gument for theories which hold that children's understanding of the mi nd is based upon introspective insight (simulation view) and those whi ch hold that understanding the mind is based upon the acquisition of a theory (theory view) are discussed. Developmental evidence illustrati ng Wittgenstein's private language argument and its differences from t he simulation and theory views is presented. Points of compatibility b etween the theory view and Wittgenstein's private language argument ar e discussed. The paper closes by framing Wittgenstein's view in the br oader context of children's linguistic and conceptual development and discussing the implications of these relations for future research. (C ) 1997 Academic Press.