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Table of contents of journal: The *Rand journal of economics

Results: 76-100/264

Authors: HAM JC MOUNTAIN DC CHAN MWL
Citation: Jc. Ham et al., TIME-OF-USE PRICES AND ELECTRICITY DEMAND - ALLOWING FOR SELECTION BIAS IN EXPERIMENTAL-DATA, The Rand journal of economics, 28, 1997, pp. 113-141

Authors: HECKMAN JJ SNYDER JM
Citation: Jj. Heckman et Jm. Snyder, LINEAR PROBABILITY-MODELS OF THE DEMAND FOR ATTRIBUTES WITH AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO ESTIMATING THE PREFERENCES OF LEGISLATORS, The Rand journal of economics, 28, 1997, pp. 142-189

Authors: MAGGI G
Citation: G. Maggi, ENDOGENOUS LEADERSHIP IN A NEW MARKET, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 641-659

Authors: BAGWELL K RAMEY G
Citation: K. Bagwell et G. Ramey, CAPACITY, ENTRY, AND FORWARD INDUCTION, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 660-680

Authors: BRONFMAN C MCCABE K PORTER D RASSENTI S SMITH V
Citation: C. Bronfman et al., AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE WALRASIAN TATONNEMENT MECHANISM, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 681-699

Authors: ADAMS JD JAFFE AB
Citation: Jd. Adams et Ab. Jaffe, BOUNDING THE EFFECTS OF RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT - AN INVESTIGATION USING MATCHED ESTABLISHMENT-FIRM DATA, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 700-721

Authors: ESWARAN M GALLINI N
Citation: M. Eswaran et N. Gallini, PATENT POLICY AND THE DIRECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL-CHANGE, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 722-746

Authors: SNYDER CM
Citation: Cm. Snyder, A DYNAMIC THEORY OF COUNTERVAILING POWER, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 747-769

Authors: BRIGGS HC HURYN KD MCBRIDE ME
Citation: Hc. Briggs et al., TREBLE DAMAGES AND THE INCENTIVE TO SUE AND SETTLE, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 770-786

Authors: KIM JY
Citation: Jy. Kim, CHEAP TALK AND REPUTATION IN REPEATED PRETRIAL NEGOTIATION, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 787-802

Authors: SCHLEE EE
Citation: Ee. Schlee, THE VALUE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 803-815

Authors: LEWIS TR
Citation: Tr. Lewis, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT WHEN COSTS AND BENEFITS ARE PRIVATELY KNOWN, The Rand journal of economics, 27(4), 1996, pp. 819-847

Authors: BORENSTEIN S SHEPARD A
Citation: S. Borenstein et A. Shepard, DYNAMIC PRICING IN RETAIL GASOLINE MARKETS, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 429-451

Authors: KADIYALI V
Citation: V. Kadiyali, ENTRY, ITS DETERRENCE, AND ITS ACCOMMODATION - A STUDY OF THE US PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM INDUSTRY, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 452-478

Authors: OLSEN TE
Citation: Te. Olsen, AGENCY COSTS AND THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 479-501

Authors: KLETTE TJ
Citation: Tj. Klette, RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT, SCOPE ECONOMIES, AND PLANT PERFORMANCE, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 502-522

Authors: BRANDENBURGER A POLAK B
Citation: A. Brandenburger et B. Polak, WHEN MANAGERS COVER THEIR POSTERIORS - MAKING THE DECISIONS THE MARKET WANTS TO SEE, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 523-541

Authors: SCHULZ N STAHL K
Citation: N. Schulz et K. Stahl, DO CONSUMERS SEARCH FOR THE HIGHEST PRICE - OLIGOPOLY EQUILIBRIUM ANDMONOPOLY OPTIMUM IN DIFFERENTIATED-PRODUCTS MARKETS, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 542-562

Authors: GUPTA S VANHOUTVEN G CROPPER M
Citation: S. Gupta et al., PAYING FOR PERMANENCE - AN ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS OF EPAS CLEANUP DECISIONS AT SUPERFUND SITES, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 563-582

Authors: WALDMAN M
Citation: M. Waldman, PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE AND THE RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT DECISION, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 583-595

Authors: PHILLIPS OR MASON CF
Citation: Or. Phillips et Cf. Mason, MARKET REGULATION AND MULTIMARKET RIVALRY, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 596-617

Authors: WEIL D
Citation: D. Weil, IF OSHA IS SO BAD, WHY IS COMPLIANCE SO GOOD, The Rand journal of economics, 27(3), 1996, pp. 618-640

Authors: MARTIMORT D
Citation: D. Martimort, EXCLUSIVE DEALING, COMMON AGENCY, AND MULTIPRINCIPALS INCENTIVE THEORY, The Rand journal of economics, 27(1), 1996, pp. 1-31

Authors: HENDERSON R COCKBURN I
Citation: R. Henderson et I. Cockburn, SCALE, SCOPE, AND SPILLOVERS - THE DETERMINANTS OF RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY IN DRUG DISCOVERY, The Rand journal of economics, 27(1), 1996, pp. 32-59

Authors: MATUTES C REGIBEAU P ROCKETT K
Citation: C. Matutes et al., OPTIMAL PATENT DESIGN AND THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS, The Rand journal of economics, 27(1), 1996, pp. 60-83
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