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Results: 76-100/265
Authors:
KARA T
SONMEZ T
Citation: T. Kara et T. Sonmez, IMPLEMENTATION OF COLLEGE ADMISSION RULES, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 197-218
Authors:
SAARI DG
Citation: Dg. Saari, THE GENERIC EXISTENCE OF A CORE FOR Q-RULES, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 219-260
Authors:
GILLES C
LEROY SF
Citation: C. Gilles et Sf. Leroy, BUBBLES AS PAYOFFS AT INFINITY, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 261-281
Authors:
HYDE CE
Citation: Ce. Hyde, MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN BARGAINING MODELS OF DECENTRALIZED TRADE, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 283-307
Authors:
MORRIS S
SHIN HS
Citation: S. Morris et Hs. Shin, THE RATIONALITY AND EFFICACY OF DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND THE VALUE OF AN EXPERIMENT, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 309-324
Authors:
BALA V
Citation: V. Bala, RECONSTRUCTING DYNAMICS FROM INTERTEMPORAL ECONOMIC DATA, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 325-339
Authors:
ASHEIM GB
NILSSEN T
Citation: Gb. Asheim et T. Nilssen, INSURANCE MONOPOLY AND RENEGOTIATION, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 341-354
Authors:
TREJOS A
Citation: A. Trejos, INCENTIVES TO PRODUCE QUALITY AND THE LIQUIDITY OF MONEY, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 355-365
Authors:
MEHTA GB
Citation: Gb. Mehta, A REMARK ON A UTILITY REPRESENTATION THEOREM OF RADER, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 367-370
Authors:
KOMIYA H
Citation: H. Komiya, INVERSE OF THE BERGE MAXIMUM THEOREM, Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 371-375
Authors:
CHAKRAVORTI B
CONLEY J
TAUB B
Citation: B. Chakravorti et al., ON UNIQUELY IMPLEMENTING COOPERATION IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA (VOL 8,PG 347, 1996), Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 377-378
Authors:
SERIZAWA S
Citation: S. Serizawa, STRATEGY-PROOF AND INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS FOR PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMIES (VOL 7, PG 501, 1996), Economic theory, 9(2), 1997, pp. 379-380
Authors:
CASS D
Citation: D. Cass, YOUNES,YVES (1937-1996) - IN-MEMORIAM, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 1-1
Authors:
DUFFIE D
SCHRODER M
SKIADAS C
Citation: D. Duffie et al., A TERM STRUCTURE MODEL WITH PREFERENCES FOR THE TIMING OF RESOLUTION OF UNCERTAINTY, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 3-22
Authors:
MUKERJI S
Citation: S. Mukerji, UNDERSTANDING THE NONADDITIVE PROBABILITY DECISION-MODEL, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 23-46
Authors:
GILBOA I
SCHMEIDLER D
Citation: I. Gilboa et D. Schmeidler, ACT SIMILARITY IN CASE-BASED DECISION-THEORY, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 47-61
Authors:
DAVIS DD
HOLT CA
Citation: Dd. Davis et Ca. Holt, PRICE RIGIDITIES AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIATIONS IN MARKETS WITH POSTED PRICES, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 63-80
Authors:
KLINE JJ
Citation: Jj. Kline, INFORMATION STRUCTURES AND DECENTRALIZABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 81-96
Authors:
KONISHI H
LEBRETON M
WEBER S
Citation: H. Konishi et al., EQUIVALENCE OF STRONG AND COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITHOUT SPILLOVERS, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 97-113
Authors:
WOODERS MH
Citation: Mh. Wooders, EQUIVALENCE OF LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM WITH PARTICIPATION PRICES AND THE CORE, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 115-127
Authors:
PASCOA MR
Citation: Mr. Pascoa, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND NON-NEIGHBORING-GOODS, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 129-142
Authors:
LAUWERS L
Citation: L. Lauwers, RAWLSIAN EQUITY AND GENERALIZED UTILITARIANISM WITH AN INFINITE POPULATION, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 143-150
Authors:
PAGE FH
Citation: Fh. Page, MARKET GAMES WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION AND INFINITE-DIMENSIONAL COMMODITY SPACES - THE CORE, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 151-159
Authors:
BALDER EJ
Citation: Ej. Balder, REMARKS ON NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR GAMES WITH ADDITIVELY COUPLED PAYOFFS, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 161-167
Authors:
GOENKA A
SHELL K
Citation: A. Goenka et K. Shell, WHEN SUNSPOTS DONT MATTER, Economic theory, 9(1), 1997, pp. 169-178