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Table of contents of journal: *Public choice

Results: 601-625/1132
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT - A NOTE ON SOPHISTICATED VOTING UNDER BORDAS METHOD
Authors: FELSENTHAL DS
Citation: Ds. Felsenthal, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT - A NOTE ON SOPHISTICATED VOTING UNDER BORDAS METHOD, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 17-25
BUREAUCRACY, ALTRUISM, AND MONETARY-POLICY - A NOTE FROM A FORECASTING PERSPECTIVE
Authors: MOUNTS WS SOWELL C
Citation: Ws. Mounts et C. Sowell, BUREAUCRACY, ALTRUISM, AND MONETARY-POLICY - A NOTE FROM A FORECASTING PERSPECTIVE, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 27-34
THE COST DISEASE AND GOVERNMENT GROWTH - QUALIFICATIONS TO BAUMOL
Authors: FERRIS JS WEST EG
Citation: Js. Ferris et Eg. West, THE COST DISEASE AND GOVERNMENT GROWTH - QUALIFICATIONS TO BAUMOL, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 35-52
(NON)EQUIVALENCE IN A FEDERALISM - DUAL TAX SHARES, FLYPAPER EFFECTS AND LEVIATHAN
Authors: ARONSON JR MUNLEY VG
Citation: Jr. Aronson et Vg. Munley, (NON)EQUIVALENCE IN A FEDERALISM - DUAL TAX SHARES, FLYPAPER EFFECTS AND LEVIATHAN, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 53-62
IF PEOPLE VOTE BECAUSE THEY LIKE TO, THEN WHY DO SO MANY OF THEM LIE
Authors: HARBAUGH WT
Citation: Wt. Harbaugh, IF PEOPLE VOTE BECAUSE THEY LIKE TO, THEN WHY DO SO MANY OF THEM LIE, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 63-76
BRU-U-U-UCE - THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF MOB GOODS
Authors: DESERPA AC FAITH RL
Citation: Ac. Deserpa et Rl. Faith, BRU-U-U-UCE - THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF MOB GOODS, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 77-91
THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF PROPERTY TAXES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Authors: GLAESER EL
Citation: El. Glaeser, THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF PROPERTY TAXES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 93-111
INNOVATIONS, EXTERNALITIES AND THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS
Authors: WITT U
Citation: U. Witt, INNOVATIONS, EXTERNALITIES AND THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 113-130
EMPLOYMENT-SERVICE - PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
Authors: ZWEIFEL P ZABOROWSKI C
Citation: P. Zweifel et C. Zaborowski, EMPLOYMENT-SERVICE - PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 131-162
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE - A PANELDATA APPROACH
Authors: EIJFFINGER S VANROOIJ M SCHALING E
Citation: S. Eijffinger et al., CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE - A PANELDATA APPROACH, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 163-182
GOVERNMENT SPENDING CYCLES - IDEOLOGICAL OR OPPORTUNISTIC
Authors: VANDALEN HP SWANK OH
Citation: Hp. Vandalen et Oh. Swank, GOVERNMENT SPENDING CYCLES - IDEOLOGICAL OR OPPORTUNISTIC, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 183-200
THE ROLE OF COMMON-LAW IN ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY - COMMENT
Authors: SCHWARZE R
Citation: R. Schwarze, THE ROLE OF COMMON-LAW IN ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY - COMMENT, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 201-205
COMMON-LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT - REPLY
Authors: SOLLNER F
Citation: F. Sollner, COMMON-LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT - REPLY, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 207-209
CHOOSING THE CHIEF - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED-STATES - PIERCE,R
Authors: SUTTER D
Citation: D. Sutter, CHOOSING THE CHIEF - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED-STATES - PIERCE,R, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 211-214
POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS - ZAJAC,EE
Authors: OWEN G
Citation: G. Owen, POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS - ZAJAC,EE, Public choice, 89(1-2), 1996, pp. 214-217
FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT PERSPECTIVE
Authors: VACHRIS MA
Citation: Ma. Vachris, FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT PERSPECTIVE, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 223-238
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE - PARTIES, COMMITTEES ANDMULTIPLE REFERRAL
Authors: BAWN K
Citation: K. Bawn, STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE - PARTIES, COMMITTEES ANDMULTIPLE REFERRAL, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 239-258
A MATHEMATICAL ONE-MAN ONE-VOTE RATIONALE FOR MADISONIAN PRESIDENTIALVOTING BASED ON MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL VOTING POWER
Authors: NATAPOFF A
Citation: A. Natapoff, A MATHEMATICAL ONE-MAN ONE-VOTE RATIONALE FOR MADISONIAN PRESIDENTIALVOTING BASED ON MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL VOTING POWER, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 259-273
RETHINKING WARD AND AT-LARGE ELECTIONS IN CITIES - TOTAL SPENDING, THE NUMBER OF LOCATIONS OF SELECTED CITY SERVICES, AND POLICY TYPES
Authors: LANGBEIN LI CREWSON P BRASHER CN
Citation: Li. Langbein et al., RETHINKING WARD AND AT-LARGE ELECTIONS IN CITIES - TOTAL SPENDING, THE NUMBER OF LOCATIONS OF SELECTED CITY SERVICES, AND POLICY TYPES, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 275-293
DO GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES INCREASE THE PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC-GOODS
Authors: ANDREONI J BERGSTROM T
Citation: J. Andreoni et T. Bergstrom, DO GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES INCREASE THE PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC-GOODS, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 295-308
CORPORATE POLITICAL OFFICES IN A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY
Authors: JOHNSON PE
Citation: Pe. Johnson, CORPORATE POLITICAL OFFICES IN A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 309-331
A POLITICAL ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS OF LABOR MIGRATION AND INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION
Authors: MAZZA I VANWINDEN F
Citation: I. Mazza et F. Vanwinden, A POLITICAL ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS OF LABOR MIGRATION AND INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 333-363
CHANGING PARADIGMS - CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PUBLIC-SECTOR INLATIN-AMERICA ECONOMIES
Authors: BAER W
Citation: W. Baer, CHANGING PARADIGMS - CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PUBLIC-SECTOR INLATIN-AMERICA ECONOMIES, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 365-379
TO FIGHT OR NOT TO FIGHT - AN ANALYSIS OF SUBMISSION, STRUGGLE, AND THE DESIGN OF CONTESTS
Authors: KORBER A KOLMAR M
Citation: A. Korber et M. Kolmar, TO FIGHT OR NOT TO FIGHT - AN ANALYSIS OF SUBMISSION, STRUGGLE, AND THE DESIGN OF CONTESTS, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 381-392
EXITING BEHAVIOR UNDER TIEBOUT CONDITIONS - TOWARDS A PREDICTIVE MODEL
Authors: DOWDING K JOHN P
Citation: K. Dowding et P. John, EXITING BEHAVIOR UNDER TIEBOUT CONDITIONS - TOWARDS A PREDICTIVE MODEL, Public choice, 88(3-4), 1996, pp. 393-406
Risultati: << | 601-625 | 626-650 | 651-675 | 676-700 | >>