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Results: 201-220/220
Authors:
JUNG CH
KRUTILLA K
VISCUSI WK
BOYD R
Citation: Ch. Jung et al., THE COASE THEOREM IN A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, International review of law and economics, 15(3), 1995, pp. 259-268
Authors:
TAYLOR R
Citation: R. Taylor, A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF GUN-CONTROL, International review of law and economics, 15(3), 1995, pp. 269-288
Authors:
BABCOCK L
FARBER HS
FOBIAN C
SHAFIR E
Citation: L. Babcock et al., FORMING BELIEFS ABOUT ADJUDICATED OUTCOMES - PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND RESERVATION VALUES, International review of law and economics, 15(3), 1995, pp. 289-303
Authors:
CHU CYC
QIAN YY
Citation: Cyc. Chu et Yy. Qian, VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER A NEGLIGENCE RULE, International review of law and economics, 15(3), 1995, pp. 305-322
Authors:
RASMUSEN E
Citation: E. Rasmusen, PREDICTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE ERROR IN TORT AWARDS - THE EFFECT OF PLAINTIFF SELF-SELECTION AND SIGNALING, International review of law and economics, 15(3), 1995, pp. 323-345
Authors:
HOLM HJ
Citation: Hj. Holm, COMPUTATIONAL COST OF VERIFYING ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 127-140
Authors:
HASEN RL
Citation: Rl. Hasen, THE EFFICIENT DUTY TO RESCUE, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 141-150
Authors:
BOSE P
Citation: P. Bose, ANTICIPATORY COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVE REGULATORY ACTIVITY, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 151-159
Authors:
MICELI TJ
SIRMANS CF
Citation: Tj. Miceli et Cf. Sirmans, AN ECONOMIC-THEORY OF ADVERSE POSSESSION, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 161-173
Authors:
KAHAN M
TUCKMAN B
Citation: M. Kahan et B. Tuckman, SPECIAL LEVIES ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES - DECOUPLING, AGENCY PROBLEMS, ANDLITIGATION EXPENDITURES, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 175-185
Authors:
FISCHEL WA
Citation: Wa. Fischel, THE OFFER ASK DISPARITY AND JUST COMPENSATION FOR TAKINGS - A CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 187-203
Authors:
BECKNER CF
KATZ A
Citation: Cf. Beckner et A. Katz, THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF LITIGATION FEE SHIFTING WHEN LEGAL STANDARDSARE UNCERTAIN, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 205-224
Authors:
DNES AW
Citation: Aw. Dnes, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT MODIFICATION - THE CASE OF WILLIAMSV ROFFEY, International review of law and economics, 15(2), 1995, pp. 225-240
Authors:
BIGGAR D
Citation: D. Biggar, A MODEL OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORT, International review of law and economics, 15(1), 1995, pp. 1-24
Authors:
DICK AR
Citation: Ar. Dick, WHEN DOES ORGANIZED-CRIME PAY - A TRANSACTION COST-ANALYSIS, International review of law and economics, 15(1), 1995, pp. 25-45
Authors:
HUDSON J
Citation: J. Hudson, THE CASE AGAINST SECURED LENDING, International review of law and economics, 15(1), 1995, pp. 47-63
Authors:
JOST PJ
Citation: Pj. Jost, DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR CARE, International review of law and economics, 15(1), 1995, pp. 65-85
Authors:
MICELI TJ
Citation: Tj. Miceli, CONTRACT MODIFICATION WHEN LITIGATING FOR DAMAGES IS COSTLY, International review of law and economics, 15(1), 1995, pp. 87-99
Authors:
RASMUSEN E
Citation: E. Rasmusen, HOW OPTIMAL PENALTIES CHANGE WITH THE AMOUNT OF HARM, International review of law and economics, 15(1), 1995, pp. 101-108
Authors:
NAGIN D
WALDFOGEL J
Citation: D. Nagin et J. Waldfogel, THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINALITY AND CONVICTION ON THE LABOR-MARKET STATUS OF YOUNG BRITISH OFFENDERS, International review of law and economics, 15(1), 1995, pp. 109-126