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Table of contents of journal: The *Rand journal of economics

Results: 151-175/373

Authors: ELLISON SF COCKBURN I GRILICHES Z HAUSMAN J
Citation: Sf. Ellison et al., CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMAND FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS - AN EXAMINATION OF 4 CEPHALOSPORINS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 426-446

Authors: LOPEZDESILANES F SHLEIFER A VISHNY RW
Citation: F. Lopezdesilanes et al., PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED-STATES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 447-471

Authors: KLEMPERER P PADILLA AJ
Citation: P. Klemperer et Aj. Padilla, DO FIRMS PRODUCT LINES INCLUDE TOO MANY VARIETIES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 472-488

Authors: ROSE NL SHEPARD A
Citation: Nl. Rose et A. Shepard, FIRM DIVERSIFICATION AND CEO COMPENSATION - MANAGERIAL ABILITY OR EXECUTIVE ENTRENCHMENT, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 489-514

Authors: TAUB B
Citation: B. Taub, DYNAMIC AGENCY WITH FEEDBACK, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 515-543

Authors: BEGGS A GRADDY K
Citation: A. Beggs et K. Graddy, DECLINING VALUES AND THE AFTERNOON EFFECT - EVIDENCE FROM ART AUCTIONS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 544-565

Authors: MATHEWSON F WINTER R
Citation: F. Mathewson et R. Winter, TYING AS A RESPONSE TO DEMAND UNCERTAINTY, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 566-583

Authors: BAGWELL K RAMEY G SPULBER DF
Citation: K. Bagwell et al., DYNAMIC RETAIL PRICE AND INVESTMENT COMPETITION, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 207-227

Authors: LERNER J
Citation: J. Lerner, AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF A TECHNOLOGY RACE, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 228-247

Authors: PETRAKIS E RASMUSEN E ROY S
Citation: E. Petrakis et al., THE LEARNING-CURVE IN A COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 248-268

Authors: MORTON FS
Citation: Fs. Morton, THE STRATEGIC RESPONSE BY PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS TO THE MEDICAID MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER RULES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 269-290

Authors: HENDRICKS K PICCIONE M TAN GF
Citation: K. Hendricks et al., ENTRY AND EXIT IN HUB-SPOKE NETWORKS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 291-303

Authors: PARKER PM ROLLER LH
Citation: Pm. Parker et Lh. Roller, COLLUSIVE CONDUCT IN DUOPOLIES - MULTIMARKET CONTACT AND CROSS-OWNERSHIP IN THE MOBILE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 304-322

Authors: MEZZETTI C
Citation: C. Mezzetti, COMMON AGENCY WITH HORIZONTALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRINCIPALS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 323-345

Authors: LEWIS TR SAPPINGTON DEM
Citation: Tr. Lewis et Dem. Sappington, PENALIZING SUCCESS IN DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS - NO GOOD DEED GOESUNPUNISHED, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 346-358

Authors: WINTER RA
Citation: Ra. Winter, COLLUDING ON RELATIVE PRICES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 359-371

Authors: LEHMANNGRUBE U
Citation: U. Lehmanngrube, STRATEGIC CHOICE OF QUALITY WHEN QUALITY IS COSTLY - THE PERSISTENCE OF THE HIGH-QUALITY ADVANTAGE, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 372-384

Authors: SPIEGEL Y SPULBER DF
Citation: Y. Spiegel et Df. Spulber, CAPITAL STRUCTURE WITH COUNTERVAILING INCENTIVES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 1-24

Authors: KIM JH
Citation: Jh. Kim, INEFFICIENCY OF SUBGAME OPTIMAL ENTRY REGULATION, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 25-36

Authors: KUHN KU
Citation: Ku. Kuhn, NONLINEAR PRICING IN VERTICALLY RELATED DUOPOLIES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 37-62

Authors: BRANCO F
Citation: F. Branco, THE DESIGN OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL AUCTIONS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 63-81

Authors: BAGWELL K STAIGER RW
Citation: K. Bagwell et Rw. Staiger, COLLUSION OVER THE BUSINESS-CYCLE, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 82-106

Authors: EMONS W
Citation: W. Emons, CREDENCE GOODS AND FRAUDULENT EXPERTS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 107-119

Authors: CHE YK EARNHART D
Citation: Yk. Che et D. Earnhart, OPTIMAL USE OF INFORMATION IN LITIGATION - SHOULD REGULATORY INFORMATION BE WITHHELD TO DETER FRIVOLOUS SUITS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 120-134

Authors: EATON C ESWARAN M
Citation: C. Eaton et M. Eswaran, TECHNOLOGY-TRADING COALITIONS IN SUPERGAMES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 135-149
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