Authors:
ELLISON SF
COCKBURN I
GRILICHES Z
HAUSMAN J
Citation: Sf. Ellison et al., CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMAND FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS - AN EXAMINATION OF 4 CEPHALOSPORINS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 426-446
Citation: Nl. Rose et A. Shepard, FIRM DIVERSIFICATION AND CEO COMPENSATION - MANAGERIAL ABILITY OR EXECUTIVE ENTRENCHMENT, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 489-514
Citation: A. Beggs et K. Graddy, DECLINING VALUES AND THE AFTERNOON EFFECT - EVIDENCE FROM ART AUCTIONS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(3), 1997, pp. 544-565
Citation: Fs. Morton, THE STRATEGIC RESPONSE BY PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS TO THE MEDICAID MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER RULES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 269-290
Citation: Pm. Parker et Lh. Roller, COLLUSIVE CONDUCT IN DUOPOLIES - MULTIMARKET CONTACT AND CROSS-OWNERSHIP IN THE MOBILE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 304-322
Citation: Tr. Lewis et Dem. Sappington, PENALIZING SUCCESS IN DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS - NO GOOD DEED GOESUNPUNISHED, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 346-358
Citation: U. Lehmanngrube, STRATEGIC CHOICE OF QUALITY WHEN QUALITY IS COSTLY - THE PERSISTENCE OF THE HIGH-QUALITY ADVANTAGE, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 372-384
Citation: Yk. Che et D. Earnhart, OPTIMAL USE OF INFORMATION IN LITIGATION - SHOULD REGULATORY INFORMATION BE WITHHELD TO DETER FRIVOLOUS SUITS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 120-134