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Results:
1-9
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Results: 9
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Valognes, F
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et F. Valognes, Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference, SOC CHOICE, 18(1), 2001, pp. 193-205
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Lepelley, D
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters, MATH SOC SC, 41(1), 2001, pp. 39-50
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein, Condorcet winners on four candidates with anonymous voters, ECON LETT, 71(3), 2001, pp. 335-340
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Gehrlein, WV
Citation: D. Lepelley et Wv. Gehrlein, Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules, ECON LETT, 68(2), 2000, pp. 157-164
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Lepelley, D
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner, ECON LETT, 66(2), 2000, pp. 191-197
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Lepelley, D
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition, SOC CHOICE, 16(3), 1999, pp. 471-490
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein, Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule under the dual culture condition, SOC SCI RES, 28(1), 1999, pp. 36-44
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein, On the probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the Condorcet winner, QUAL QUANT, 33(1), 1999, pp. 77-84
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Gehrlein, WV
Citation: D. Lepelley et Wv. Gehrlein, A note on the probability of having a strong Condorcet winner, QUAL QUANT, 33(1), 1999, pp. 85-96
Risultati:
1-9
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