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Results: 1-17 |
Results: 17

Authors: ERIKSON RS PALFREY TR
Citation: Rs. Erikson et Tr. Palfrey, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND INCUMBENCY - AN ALTERNATIVE SIMULTANEOUS-EQUATIONS APPROACH, The Journal of politics, 60(2), 1998, pp. 355-373

Authors: JACKSON MO PALFREY TR
Citation: Mo. Jackson et Tr. Palfrey, EFFICIENCY AND VOLUNTARY IMPLEMENTATION IN MARKETS WITH REPEATED PAIRWISE BARGAINING, Econometrica, 66(6), 1998, pp. 1353-1388

Authors: MCKELVEY RD PALFREY TR
Citation: Rd. Mckelvey et Tr. Palfrey, ENDOGENEITY OF ALTERNATING OFFERS IN A BARGAINING GAME, Journal of economic theory, 73(2), 1997, pp. 425-437

Authors: PALFREY TR PRISBREY JE
Citation: Tr. Palfrey et Je. Prisbrey, ANOMALOUS BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS - HOW MUCH AND WHY, The American economic review, 87(5), 1997, pp. 829-846

Authors: PALFREY TR PRISBREY JE
Citation: Tr. Palfrey et Je. Prisbrey, ALTRUISM, REPUTATION AND NOISE IN LINEAR PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS, Journal of public economics, 61(3), 1996, pp. 409-427

Authors: ELGAMAL MA PALFREY TR
Citation: Ma. Elgamal et Tr. Palfrey, ECONOMICAL EXPERIMENTS - BAYESIAN EFFICIENT EXPERIMENTAL-DESIGN, International journal of game theory, 25(4), 1996, pp. 495-517

Authors: FEY M MCKELVEY RD PALFREY TR
Citation: M. Fey et al., AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF CONSTANT-SUM CENTIPEDE GAMES, International journal of game theory, 25(3), 1996, pp. 269-287

Authors: CREMER J PALFREY TR
Citation: J. Cremer et Tr. Palfrey, IN OR OUT - CENTRALIZATION BY MAJORITY VOTE, European economic review, 40(1), 1996, pp. 43-60

Authors: ELGAMAL MA PALFREY TR
Citation: Ma. Elgamal et Tr. Palfrey, VERTIGO - COMPARING STRUCTURAL MODELS OF IMPERFECT BEHAVIOR IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 8(2), 1995, pp. 322-348

Authors: CRAMTON PC PALFREY TR
Citation: Pc. Cramton et Tr. Palfrey, RATIFYABLE MECHANISMS - LEARNING FROM DISAGREEMENT, Games and economic behavior, 10(2), 1995, pp. 255-283

Authors: LEDYARD JO PALFREY TR
Citation: Jo. Ledyard et Tr. Palfrey, EXPERIMENTAL GAME-THEORY - INTRODUCTION, Games and economic behavior, 10(1), 1995, pp. 1-5

Authors: MCKELVEY RD PALFREY TR
Citation: Rd. Mckelvey et Tr. Palfrey, QUANTAL RESPONSE EQUILIBRIA FOR NORMAL-FORM GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 10(1), 1995, pp. 6-38

Authors: JACKSON MO PALFREY TR SRIVASTAVA S
Citation: Mo. Jackson et al., UNDOMINATED NASH IMPLEMENTATION IN BOUNDED MECHANISMS, Games and economic behavior, 6(3), 1994, pp. 474-501

Authors: PALFREY TR ROSENTHAL H
Citation: Tr. Palfrey et H. Rosenthal, REPEATED PLAY, COOPERATION AND COORDINATION - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY, Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 1994, pp. 545-565

Authors: LEDYARD JO PALFREY TR
Citation: Jo. Ledyard et Tr. Palfrey, VOTING AND LOTTERY DRAFTS AS EFFICIENT PUBLIC-GOODS MECHANISMS, Review of Economic Studies, 61(2), 1994, pp. 327-355

Authors: ELGAMAL MA MCKELVEY RD PALFREY TR
Citation: Ma. Elgamal et al., A BAYESIAN SEQUENTIAL EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF LEARNING IN GAMES, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88(422), 1993, pp. 428-435

Authors: ELGAMAL MA MCKELVEY RD PALFREY TR
Citation: Ma. Elgamal et al., COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES IN THE STATISTICAL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, The international journal of supercomputer applications and high performance computing, 7(3), 1993, pp. 189-200
Risultati: 1-17 |