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Citation: Te. Olsen et G. Torsvik, COLLUSION AND RENEGOTIATION IN HIERARCHIES - A CASE OF BENEFICIAL CORRUPTION, International economic review, 39(2), 1998, pp. 413-438

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Citation: Ma. Meyer et al., LIMITED INTERTEMPORAL COMMITMENT AND JOB DESIGN, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 31(3), 1996, pp. 401-417

Authors: OLSEN TE TORSVIK G

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Citation: G. Torsvik, WHEN GROUPS CONTRIBUTE TO A PUBLIC GOOD - THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING COLLECTIVE DECISIONS, Public choice, 80(1-2), 1994, pp. 41-54

Authors: OLSEN TE TORSVIK G

Citation: Te. Olsen et G. Torsvik, THE RATCHET EFFECT IN COMMON AGENCY - IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION ANDPRIVATIZATION, Journal of law, economics, & organization, 9(1), 1993, pp. 136-158

Authors: TORSVIK G

Citation: G. Torsvik, REGIONAL-INCENTIVE PROGRAMS AND THE PROBLEM OF TIME-INCONSISTENT PLANS, Journal of economics, 58(2), 1993, pp. 187-202