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Results: 26-50/125
Authors:
XU F
Citation: F. Xu, FROM LOTS WIDE TO A PILLAR OF SALT - EVIDENCE THAT PHYSICAL OBJECT ISA SORTAL CONCEPT, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 365-392
Authors:
AYERS M
Citation: M. Ayers, IS PHYSICAL OBJECT A SORTAL CONCEPT - A REPLY TO XU, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 393-405
Authors:
HIRSCH E
Citation: E. Hirsch, BASIC OBJECTS - A REPLY TO XU, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 406-412
Authors:
WIGGINS D
Citation: D. Wiggins, SORTAL CONCEPTS - A REPLY TO XU, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 413-421
Authors:
AYDEDE M
Citation: M. Aydede, HAS FODOR REALLY CHANGED HIS MIND ON NARROW CONTENT, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 422-458
Authors:
BROOK A
STAINTON RJ
Citation: A. Brook et Rj. Stainton, FODORS NEW THEORY OF CONTENT AND COMPUTATION, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 459-474
Authors:
RAY G
Citation: G. Ray, FODOR AND THE INSCRUTABILITY PROBLEM, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 475-489
Authors:
SEGAL GMA
Citation: Gma. Segal, CONTENT AND COMPUTATION - CHASING THE ARROWS - A CRITICAL NOTICE OF FODOR,JERRY THE ELM AND THE EXPERT, Mind & language, 12(3-4), 1997, pp. 490-501
Authors:
AIZAWA K
Citation: K. Aizawa, EXPLAINING SYSTEMATICITY, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 115-136
Authors:
HADLEY RF
Citation: Rf. Hadley, COGNITION, SYSTEMATICITY AND NOMIC NECESSITY, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 137-153
Authors:
MATTHEWS RJ
Citation: Rj. Matthews, CAN CONNECTIONISTS EXPLAIN SYSTEMATICITY, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 154-177
Authors:
NELKIN N
Citation: N. Nelkin, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF THOUGHT, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 178-180
Authors:
CARRUTHERS P
Citation: P. Carruthers, FRAGMENTARY VERSUS REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS - NELKIN,N, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 181-195
Authors:
FORBES G
Citation: G. Forbes, EXTERNALISM AND SCIENTIFIC CARTESIANISM - NELKIN,N, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 196-205
Authors:
ROSENTHAL DM
Citation: Dm. Rosenthal, APPERCEPTION, SENSATION, AND DISSOCIABILITY - NELKIN,N, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 206-223
Authors:
STOERIG P
Citation: P. Stoerig, PHENOMENAL VISION AND APPERCEPTION - EVIDENCE FROM BLINDSIGHT - NELKIN,N, Mind & language, 12(2), 1997, pp. 224-237
Authors:
MILLER A
Citation: A. Miller, BOGHOSSIAN ON REDUCTIVE DISPOSITIONALISM ABOUT CONTENT - THE CASE STRENGTHENED, Mind & language, 12(1), 1997, pp. 1-10
Authors:
PAGIN P
Citation: P. Pagin, IS COMPOSITIONALITY COMPATIBLE WITH HOLISM, Mind & language, 12(1), 1997, pp. 11-33
Authors:
RAMSEY W
Citation: W. Ramsey, DO CONNECTIONIST REPRESENTATIONS EARN THEIR EXPLANATORY KEEP, Mind & language, 12(1), 1997, pp. 34-66
Authors:
SPERBER D
Citation: D. Sperber, INTUITIVE AND REFLECTIVE BELIEFS, Mind & language, 12(1), 1997, pp. 67-83
Authors:
RECANATI F
Citation: F. Recanati, CAN WE BELIEVE WHAT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND, Mind & language, 12(1), 1997, pp. 84-100
Authors:
LEVINE J
Citation: J. Levine, ARE QUALIA JUST REPRESENTATIONS - A CRITICAL NOTICE OF TYE,MICHAEL 10PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS, Mind & language, 12(1), 1997, pp. 101-113
Authors:
BUTLER K
Citation: K. Butler, INDIVIDUALISM AND MARRS COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF VISION, Mind & language, 11(4), 1996, pp. 313-337
Authors:
PIETROSKI PM
Citation: Pm. Pietroski, FREGEAN INNOCENCE, Mind & language, 11(4), 1996, pp. 338-370
Authors:
RAMACHANDRAN M
Citation: M. Ramachandran, THE AMBIGUITY THESIS VERSUS KRIPKES DEFENSE OF RUSSELL, Mind & language, 11(4), 1996, pp. 371-387