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Citation: Aj. Ros, Does ownership or competition matter? The effects of telecommunications reform on network expansion and efficiency, J REGUL EC, 15(1), 1999, pp. 65-92
Citation: Ja. Lesser et Cd. Feinstein, Electric utility restructuring, regulation of distribution utilities, and the fallacy of "avoided cost" rules, J REGUL EC, 15(1), 1999, pp. 93-110
Citation: Tr. Roycroft, A DYNAMIC-MODEL OF INCUMBENT LEC RESPONSE TO ENTRY UNDER THE TERMS OFTHE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 211-227
Citation: Iwh. Parry, POLLUTION REGULATION AND THE EFFICIENCY GAINS FROM TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 229-254
Citation: N. Oljaca et al., PENALTY-FUNCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS - EVIDENCE FROM WATER-QUALITY ENFORCEMENT, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 255-264
Citation: A. Erenrich et Re. Caves, COMPETITION IN PAYPHONES - STATE REGULATIONS AND INDEPENDENT PROVIDERS SHARES, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 265-279
Citation: Aj. Cox et J. Portes, MERGERS IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES - THE USES AND ABUSES OF EVENT STUDIES, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 281-304
Citation: Ma. Crew et Pr. Kleindorfer, EFFICIENT ENTRY, MONOPOLY, AND THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATION IN POSTAL SERVICE, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(2), 1998, pp. 103-125
Citation: Kk. Lear et Jw. Maxwell, THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND PENALTY POLICIES ON INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(2), 1998, pp. 127-148
Citation: Am. Marino, REGULATION OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS VERSUS EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 5-18
Citation: An. Kleit, DID OPEN ACCESS INTEGRATE NATURAL-GAS MARKETS - AN ARBITRAGE COST APPROACH, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 19-33
Citation: L. Blank et al., DOMINANT FIRM PRICING WITH COMPETITIVE ENTRY AND REGULATION - THE CASE OF INTRALATA TOLL, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 35-53
Citation: Tn. Cason et L. Gangadharan, AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD TRADING FOR EMISSION PERMITS, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 55-73
Citation: D. Reiffen, A REGULATED FIRMS INCENTIVE TO DISCRIMINATE - A REEVALUATION AND EXTENSION OF WEISMANS RESULT, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 79-86