Citation: T. Besley et S. Coate, SOURCES OF INEFFICIENCY IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY - A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS, The American economic review, 88(1), 1998, pp. 139-156
Citation: A. Dixit et T. Besley, MIRRLEES,JAMES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES, The Scandinavian journal of economics, 99(2), 1997, pp. 207-235
Citation: Ar. Levenson et T. Besley, THE ANATOMY OF AN INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKET - ROSCA PARTICIPATION IN TAIWAN, Journal of development economics, 51(1), 1996, pp. 45-68
Citation: T. Besley et Ar. Levenson, THE ROLE OF INFORMAL FINANCE IN HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL ACCUMULATION - EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN, Economic journal, 106(434), 1996, pp. 39-59
Citation: T. Besley, NONMARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR CREDIT AND RISK SHARING IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES, The Journal of economic perspectives, 9(3), 1995, pp. 115-127
Citation: T. Besley et A. Case, DOES ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AFFECT ECONOMIC-POLICY CHOICES - EVIDENCE FROM GUBERNATORIAL TERM LIMITS, The Quarterly journal of economics, 110(3), 1995, pp. 769-798
Citation: T. Besley, PROPERTY-RIGHTS AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES - THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM GHANA, Journal of political economy, 103(5), 1995, pp. 903-937
Citation: T. Besley et A. Case, INCUMBENT BEHAVIOR - VOTE-SEEKING, TAX-SETTING, AND YARDSTICK COMPETITION, The American economic review, 85(1), 1995, pp. 25-45
Citation: T. Besley et al., ROTATING SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS, CREDIT MARKETS AND EFFICIENCY, Review of Economic Studies, 61(4), 1994, pp. 701-719
Citation: Av. Banerjee et al., THY NEIGHBORS KEEPER - THE DESIGN OF A CREDIT COOPERATIVE WITH THEORYAND A TEST, The Quarterly journal of economics, 109(2), 1994, pp. 491-515