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Results: 1-13 |
Results: 13
WHEN SOCIAL NORMS OVERPOWER COMPETITION - GIFT EXCHANGE IN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR-MARKETS
Authors: FEHR E KIRCHLER E WEICHBOLD A GACHTER S
Citation: E. Fehr et al., WHEN SOCIAL NORMS OVERPOWER COMPETITION - GIFT EXCHANGE IN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR-MARKETS, Journal of labor economics, 16(2), 1998, pp. 324-351
DO ADDICTS BEHAVE RATIONALLY
Authors: FEHR E ZYCH PK
Citation: E. Fehr et Pk. Zych, DO ADDICTS BEHAVE RATIONALLY, The Scandinavian journal of economics, 100(3), 1998, pp. 643-662
RECIPROCITY AND ECONOMICS - THE ECONOMIC-IMPLICATIONS OF HOMO RECIPROCANS
Authors: FEHR E GACHTER S
Citation: E. Fehr et S. Gachter, RECIPROCITY AND ECONOMICS - THE ECONOMIC-IMPLICATIONS OF HOMO RECIPROCANS, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 845-859
GIFT EXCHANGE AND RECIPROCITY IN COMPETITIVE EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS
Authors: FEHR E KIRCHSTEIGER G RIEDL A
Citation: E. Fehr et al., GIFT EXCHANGE AND RECIPROCITY IN COMPETITIVE EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS, European economic review, 42(1), 1998, pp. 1-34
RECIPROCITY AS A CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT DEVICE - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE
Authors: FEHR E GACHTER S KIRCHSTEIGER G
Citation: E. Fehr et al., RECIPROCITY AS A CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT DEVICE - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE, Econometrica, 65(4), 1997, pp. 833-860
RECIPROCAL FAIRNESS AND NONCOMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Authors: FEHR E GACHTER S KIRCHSTEIGER G
Citation: E. Fehr et al., RECIPROCAL FAIRNESS AND NONCOMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS, JITE. Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, 152(4), 1996, pp. 608-640
SOCIAL-EXCHANGE IN THE LABOR-MARKET - RECIPROCITY AND TRUST VERSUS EGOISTIC MONEY MAXIMIZATION
Authors: KIRCHLER E FEHR E EVANS R
Citation: E. Kirchler et al., SOCIAL-EXCHANGE IN THE LABOR-MARKET - RECIPROCITY AND TRUST VERSUS EGOISTIC MONEY MAXIMIZATION, Journal of economic psychology, 17(3), 1996, pp. 313-341
DOES SOCIAL-EXCHANGE INCREASE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION
Authors: GACHTER S FEHR E KMENT C
Citation: S. Gachter et al., DOES SOCIAL-EXCHANGE INCREASE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION, Kyklos, 49(4), 1996, pp. 541-554
INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT AND NON-COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN AN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR-MARKET
Authors: FEHR E KIRCHSTEIGER G RIEDL A
Citation: E. Fehr et al., INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT AND NON-COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN AN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR-MARKET, Economic journal, 106(434), 1996, pp. 106-121
WAGE BARGAINING AND SHOCK SENSITIVITY OF A SMALL OPEN-ECONOMY
Authors: FEHR E HOF FX
Citation: E. Fehr et Fx. Hof, WAGE BARGAINING AND SHOCK SENSITIVITY OF A SMALL OPEN-ECONOMY, Journal of economics, 59(3), 1994, pp. 259-286
INSIDER POWER, WAGE DISCRIMINATION AND FAIRNESS
Authors: FEHR E KIRCHSTEIGER G
Citation: E. Fehr et G. Kirchsteiger, INSIDER POWER, WAGE DISCRIMINATION AND FAIRNESS, Economic journal, 104(424), 1994, pp. 571-583
2 FORMS OF WORKERS ENTERPRISES FACING IMPERFECT LABOR-MARKETS
Authors: FEHR E SERTEL MR
Citation: E. Fehr et Mr. Sertel, 2 FORMS OF WORKERS ENTERPRISES FACING IMPERFECT LABOR-MARKETS, Economics letters, 41(2), 1993, pp. 121-127
DOES FAIRNESS PREVENT MARKET CLEARING - AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Authors: FEHR E KIRCHSTEIGER G RIEDL A
Citation: E. Fehr et al., DOES FAIRNESS PREVENT MARKET CLEARING - AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION, The Quarterly journal of economics, 108(2), 1993, pp. 437-459
Risultati: 1-13 |