Citation: Sg. Bronars et Jr. Lott, CRIMINAL DETERRENCE, GEOGRAPHIC SPILLOVERS, AND THE RIGHT TO CARRY CONCEALED HANDGUNS, The American economic review, 88(2), 1998, pp. 475-479
Authors:
MCINTYRE LC
LEAVITT JA
ASHBAUGH MD
BORGARDT J
KEITH RL
GANDOLFI AJ
QIU L
LOTT JR
FERNANDO Q
Citation: Lc. Mcintyre et al., THE NUCLEAR MICROPROBE AT THE UNIVERSITY-OF-ARIZONA, Nuclear instruments & methods in physics research. Section B, Beam interactions with materials and atoms, 130(1-4), 1997, pp. 45-50
Citation: Jr. Lott, DOES POLITICAL REFORM INCREASE WEALTH - OR, WHY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHICAGO AND VIRGINIA SCHOOLS IS REALLY AN ELASTICITY QUESTION, Public choice, 91(3-4), 1997, pp. 219-227
Citation: K. Daniel et Jr. Lott, TERM LIMITS AND ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS - EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATIVE RACES, Public choice, 90(1-4), 1997, pp. 165-184
Citation: Sg. Bronars et Jr. Lott, DO CAMPAIGN DONATIONS ALTER HOW A POLITICIAN VOTES - OR, DO DONORS SUPPORT CANDIDATES WHO VALUE THE SAME THINGS THAT THEY DO, The Journal of law & economics, 40(2), 1997, pp. 317-350
Citation: Bh. Kobayashi et Jr. Lott, IN DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND PLEA BARGAINING, International review of law and economics, 16(4), 1996, pp. 397-416
Citation: Gm. Fremling et Jr. Lott, THE BIAS TOWARDS ZERO IN AGGREGATE PERCEPTIONS - AN EXPLANATION-BASEDON RATIONALLY CALCULATING INDIVIDUALS, Economic inquiry, 34(2), 1996, pp. 276-295
Citation: Rg. Hansen et Jr. Lott, EXTERNALITIES AND CORPORATE OBJECTIVES IN A WORLD WITH DIVERSIFIED SHAREHOLDER CONSUMERS, Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 31(1), 1996, pp. 43-68
Citation: Rg. Hansen et Jr. Lott, PROFITING FROM INDUCED CHANGES IN COMPETITORS MARKET VALUES - THE CASE OF ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE, Journal of industrial economics, 43(3), 1995, pp. 261-276
Citation: Jr. Lott et Rd. Roberts, THE EXPECTED PENALTY FOR COMMITTING A CRIME - AN ANALYSIS OF MINIMUM-WAGE VIOLATIONS, The Journal of human resources, 30(2), 1995, pp. 397-408
Citation: Gr. Jung et al., AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY SENATORS FROM THE SAME STATE VOTE DIFFERENTLY SO FREQUENTLY, Journal of public economics, 54(1), 1994, pp. 65-96
Citation: Jr. Lott et Sg. Bronars, TIME-SERIES EVIDENCE ON SHIRKING IN THE UNITED-STATES HOUSE-OF-REPRESENTATIVES, Public choice, 76(1-2), 1993, pp. 125-149
Citation: Jm. Karpoff et Jr. Lott, THE REPUTATIONAL PENALTY FIRMS BEAR FROM COMMITTING CRIMINAL FRAUD, The Journal of law & economics, 36(2), 1993, pp. 757-802