Citation: T. Vanbastelaer, THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF FOOD PRICING - AN EXTENDED EMPIRICAL-TEST OFTHE INTEREST GROUP-APPROACH, Public choice, 96(1-2), 1998, pp. 43-60
Citation: Rs. Sobel, THE POLITICAL COSTS OF TAX INCREASES AND EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS - EVIDENCE FROM STATE LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER, Public choice, 96(1-2), 1998, pp. 61-79
Citation: Wr. Reed et J. Cho, A COMPARISON OF PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE VOTING WITH HETEROGENEOUS POLITICIANS, Public choice, 96(1-2), 1998, pp. 93-116
Citation: M. Finus et B. Rundshagen, TOWARD A POSITIVE THEORY OF COALITION-FORMATION AND ENDOGENOUS INSTRUMENTAL CHOICE IN GLOBAL POLLUTION-CONTROL, Public choice, 96(1-2), 1998, pp. 145-186
Citation: Fm. Bagheri et N. Habibi, POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE - A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS, Public choice, 96(1-2), 1998, pp. 187-204
Citation: S. Merrill et B. Grofman, CONCEPTUALIZING VOTER CHOICE FOR DIRECTIONAL AND DISCOUNTING MODELS OF 2-CANDIDATE SPATIAL COMPETITION IN TERMS OF SHADOW CANDIDATES, Public choice, 95(3-4), 1998, pp. 219-231
Citation: C. Twight, WHAT CONGRESSMEN KNEW AND WHEN THEY KNEW IT - FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THEORIGINS OF US BROADCASTING REGULATION, Public choice, 95(3-4), 1998, pp. 247-276
Citation: J. Schimmelpfennig, THE 1 3RD RULE - LEARNING ABOUT THE NET ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF A SUBSIDYFROM A SINGLE OBSERVATION/, Public choice, 95(3-4), 1998, pp. 331-334
Citation: J. Dehaan et Clj. Siermann, FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC-FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC-GROWTH, Public choice, 95(3-4), 1998, pp. 363-380