Citation: Pm. Churchland, TO TRANSFORM THE PHENOMENA - FEYERABEND, PROLIFERATION, AND RECURRENTNEURAL NETWORKS, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 408-420
Citation: Lc. Charland, RECONCILING COGNITIVE AND PERCEPTUAL THEORIES OF EMOTION - A REPRESENTATIONAL PROPOSAL, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 555-579
Citation: Jl. Ramsey, BETWEEN THE FUNDAMENTAL AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL - THE CHALLENGE OF SEMIEMPIRICAL METHODS, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 627-653
Citation: Cd. Horvath, SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS - FAILED INTUITIONS ABOUT ORGANISMS AND SPECIES, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 654-668
Citation: Bc. Vanfraassen, MODAL INTERPRETATION OF REPEATED MEASUREMENT - A REJOINDER TO LEEDS AND HEALEY, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 669-676
Citation: S. Gluck et S. Gimbel, DISCUSSION - AN INTERVENING CAUSE COUNTEREXAMPLE TO RAILTONS DNP MODEL OF EXPLANATION, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 692-697
Citation: Wa. Rottschaefer, ADAPTATIONAL FUNCTIONAL ASCRIPTIONS IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY - A CRITIQUE OF SCHAFFNERS VIEWS, Philosophy of science, 64(4), 1997, pp. 698-713